



June 4, 1974

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State Department review(s) completed.

Mr. Norvill Jones, Staff Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Jones:

This letter is in partial reply to your letter of February 12, 1974, addressed to the Legal Adviser. I regret the delay in this response. Unfortunately answers to some of the questions posed in the questionnaire you enclosed are still under consideration. The answers in this letter are as complete as possible at this date. Because of the contents, this letter and some enclosures, are classified. Where particular responses are unclassified, this is so indicated.

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With respect to the first several questions, which are among those for which answers are still under consideration, I would like to make clear that the Department of State has not been asked by the FBI to approve any surveillance of any American in the United States or abroad, nor has the Department asked the FBI to institute any surveillance of Americans in the United States or abroad. There are no regulations on that subject.

With this general introduction, our specific responses for the present begin with question 7.

7. For any electronic surveillance of an American which was initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department during each of the last ten years, or is currently in operation, please state:

(a) where the request originated (State, FBI, etc.);

(b) the name of the highest State official to approve the request;

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- (c) the date the operation began; and
- (d) the national security justification relied upon.

A search of the State Department's records for the period 1954-1974 has disclosed no instance of electronic surveillance of American citizens having been requested or conducted by the Department of State. We also have no record of the Department of State having approved any such surveillance.

We are aware of only one instance (described below) of an Ambassador or other Department officer in a post abroad participating in the approval process for such a surveillance, but we cannot exclude the possibility that other Embassy-based personnel may have participated. An element of the Defense Department employed a telephone tap in an American Embassy at an overseas location during the period 21-27 March 1973. This telephone intercept was used in the office of an American military member who was the subject of a criminal investigation together with various local national suspects. It was carried out under the provisions of DOD Directive 5200.24 and reported to the office of the Secretary of Defense as required by that regulation. The action was taken with the concurrence of the Chief of Mission based on probable-cause which was determined by the subject's military commander. The investigation involved was jointly conducted by United States military investigative personnel and local national police authorities. The investigation was of mutual concern to both countries. In this instance, the approval and conduct originated with the Department of Defense under the provisions of a DOD regulation as cited above. Since the concurrence of the Chief of Mission was obtained, however, it is being included in our reply.


9. What would be the effect on the operation of the Department if a judicial warrant were required for initiation of all electronic surveillances which are now initiated or cleared by the Department?

9. The Department of State has an interest in an effective intelligence/counterintelligence program, but we would defer to the operating agencies concerning the implications of a warrant procedure for their programs. To the extent that a warrant procedure may increase risk of exposure, there could also be damage to United States foreign relations.

11. For each of the last ten years please provide the number of:

(a) surveillances of Americans within the U.S. initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department of State, broken down between wiretaps, electronic eavesdropping ("bugs"), physical surveillance, cover surveillance, and other surveillance?

(b) surveillances of Americans abroad which were initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department of State, broken down between wiretaps, electronic eavesdropping ("bugs"), physical surveillance, cover surveillance, and other surveillance (please indicate any overlaps, e.g., if an American was the subject of both a wiretap and a bug)?

11.(a) (b) A search in the State Department records for the period 1964-1974 has disclosed no instance in which surveillance of Americans, either in the United States or abroad, has been requested, approved, or conducted by the Department of State, except for the special case mentioned in 7 above. 

12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance of Americans abroad:

(a) Are there any regulations governing the clearance and conduct of such operations?

12.(a) Yes, the general regulations on special investigative techniques previously furnished apply to this kind of case as well as to others (see SY 433.10 enclosed Tab A).

12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance of Americans abroad:

(b) Does the FBI or CIA normally ask for the ambassador's approval for such operations? If so, does the ambassador seek the Department's advice or keep the Department informed about such requests?

12.(b) No. The President's letter of December 9, 1969 places on each Ambassador full responsibility to direct and coordinate the activities and operations of all elements of his mission. He is responsible for the activities of all personnel present in the country to which he is accredited with the exception of members of military commands controlled by the President through the Secretary of Defense. Senior Representatives of other government agencies are required to seek the Ambassadors' guidance on policy matters but the Ambassador is not expected to be cognizant of operational details or to inform the Department of them. The FBI, however, does not normally carry out investigations overseas; it carries out liaison activities with foreign police and security units.

12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance of Americans abroad:

(c) Does the Department know how many Americans abroad are currently under U.S.-initiated surveillance, either being carried out by a U.S. agency or by cooperating foreign officials?

12.(c) No.

12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance of Americans abroad:

(d) In what proportion of the cases is surveillance of Americans abroad carried out without the approval or knowledge of the ambassador?

12.(d) Not known.

13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:

(a) the number of investigations for leaks in each of the last ten years, including the specific leak investigated.

13.) During the past ten years, the Department has investigated 23 cases of unauthorized disclosure of classified or privileged information. In many cases, the Department's inquiries were but a part of a broader investigation involving other Federal agencies.

The incidence of cases, by year, was as follows:

1964: 2	1969: 3
1965: 0	1970: 2
1966: 1	1971: 8
1967: 0	1972: 3
1968: 4	1973: 0

For specific leak investigated see summary at Tab B.

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13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:


(b) for each investigation, please indicate those in which the leak was traced to the source.

13.(b) (At Tab B is a summary of leak cases which provides supplementary responses to questions 13(b) through (f)).

In two cases investigation identified the source of the unauthorized disclosure. As noted in the summary, a number of cases concerned information which had been distributed to other agencies as well as the Department of State. Because some of those cases were controlled or investigated by the other agencies concerned, we are unable to state what degree of success they might have had in identifying sources.

13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:

(c) for each investigation in which a lie detector was used, a list of the names of Department of State personnel subjected to testing.

13.(c) The polygraph was used in the investigation of only one case, which was neither requested nor conducted by the Department of State. The information had been available to certain Departmental officials, however, and three were asked to undergo polygraph examination which they voluntarily did. The names of these officers are contained in investigative files which we believe should not be disclosed in order to protect the integrity of the files and the privacy of the officers. 

13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:

(d) for each year, the number of "special investigative techniques" used in an effort to track down leaks. Give full details on the leak involved, the number of people subject to the "special investigative techniques", the nature of the "special investigative techniques", who carried out or administered those techniques, etc.

13.(d) Other than the aforementioned use of the polygraph in one case, none of the other investigations involved any special investigative techniques. All investigations were limited to interviews with persons known or believed to have had access to the documents or information involved.

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13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:

(e) for each leak investigated, the name of the official who originated the request for the investigation -- either within the Department or outside.

13.(e) Originators of the requests for investigation of unauthorized disclosure have been identified in the summary enclosed at Tab B.

13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:

(f) copies of all reports prepared within the Department as a result of investigations of leaks over the last ten years.

13.(f) The relevant questions about the investigations have been answered in the summary at Tab B. These reports are contained in investigative files which we believe should not be disclosed in order to protect the integrity of the files and the privacy of those under investigation.

13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please provide:

(g) copies of all regulations, instructions, or orders issued within the Department, or applicable to the Department, during the last ten years relative to investigations for leaks (which have not already been supplied).

13.(g) Attached at Tab C are extracts of the instructions relative to the investigation of leaks of information.

14. With reference to the U.S. Intelligence Board, please provide the following information insofar as it is known from Departmental participation in the Board:

(a) Does the Board ever recommend the initiation of electronic surveillance operations?

(b) Is the Board apprised of the existence of electronic surveillances for national security purposes? If so, in what manner?

(c) Describe the Board's role, if any, in investigations for leaks.

(d) What was the Board's involvement, if any, in the investigations for leaks of information regarding the SALT negotiations, the Pentagon Papers, the Jack Anderson documents and other leaks during the period 1969-1972?

(e) Does the Board ever consider inter-agency matters relating to U.S. electronic surveillance activities?

14. While the Department of State has membership on the United States Intelligence Board, its Chairman is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department believes that any questions concerning the Board's activities or policies would more properly be addressed to the Chairman.

15. How many electronic surveillances initiated, approved, or carried out by State were terminated as a result of the Supreme Court decision in the Keith case, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)?

15. State had no such surveillances.

17. For each of the last ten years, please indicate the number of each of the various types of "special investigative techniques" carried out on Americans by Department of State personnel, broken down by type of "technique" used, whether in the U.S. or abroad, and whether the subject was an employee of the Department of State, a reporter, or other private citizen.

17. To the best of the Department's knowledge, none of its personnel has employed any "special investigative techniques" in relation to any American citizens at home or abroad in the past ten years.

18. How many reports have been received from posts abroad for each of the last five years concerning U.S. citizens traveling abroad who "indicate a disaffection toward the United States", as specified in 11 FAM 430.1?

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11. There is no statistical breakdown possible on this. A manual check of passport records would be necessary.

19. How many reports have been made pursuant to the telegram of November 2, 1972, concerning the reporting by U.S. diplomatic posts on the activities of U.S. military absentees in foreign countries?

19. The Department of State does not record these reports, which are primarily of concern to the Defense Department.

20. Please supply the following information for the Department of State:

(a) Number of personnel on the Department's rolls with the technical skills to conduct electronic surveillance (either bugging or tapping).

20.(a) The Department assumes that virtually anyone who can operate a home tape recorder could effect an electronic surveillance. Anyone with any of a wide variety of technical skills or experience would be even more likely to be able to do so, using equipment readily available in open commerce. Thus, it is a virtual impossibility to determine the number of personnel on the Department's rolls with adequate technical knowledge to conduct electronic surveillance. To be sure, any of the engineers or technicians of the Office of Security who are involved in the effort to counter electronic and other forms of surveillance of State premises and personnel presumably could conduct positive surveillance but none do nor are there any personnel on the rolls or on contract to the Department of State whose duties are to engage in such surveillance activities.

20. Please supply the following information for the Department of State:

(b) The number of pieces of equipment owned by or in the control of the Department capable of being used for:

- (1) telephone surveillances,
- (2) microphone surveillances,
- (3) recording telephone calls without knowledge of the caller.

20.(b) Again, assuming virtually any tape recorder could be used to record telephone or other conversations surreptitiously, any effort to account for all such pieces of equipment would require the review of literally hundreds of inventory records and to little practical purpose. In actual fact, the Department does not engage in electronic surveillance and, therefore, has no equipment intended for that purpose.


21. Please provide a copy of any forms used in connection with:

(a) the initiation, clearance, implementation, or termination of any type of surveillance of American citizens.

- 21.(a) The Department of State has no forms for use in connection with the initiation, clearance, implementation, or termination of any type of surveillance on American citizens.

21. Please provide a copy of any forms used in connection with:

(b) the use or storage of information obtained through surveillance initiated or approved by the Department of State.

21.(b) There is no form specifically designed for such information. 

[Surveillance case]

21. Please provide a copy of any forms used in connection with:

(c) requests from the FBI or other agencies to the Department, or requests initiated within the Department, for information on Americans abroad.

21.(c) The Department of State has no forms for use in connection with requests for information on Americans abroad.

22. Please provide:

(a) all effective directives concerning relations with the FBI.

22.(a) Copies of Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 102A and Department of State Instructions CW-4099 (November 9, 1961) and CW-4999 (December 19, 1961) were submitted previously in the informal stage of this review. Executive Order 10450 (Section 8-d), of course, requires referral to the FBI of any information developed during the background investigation of an applicant or employee which indicates the individual may have been guilty of disloyalty or certain other activities adversely affecting the national security.


22. Please provide:

(b) copies of all existing statutes, executive orders, and regulations concerning reporting on Americans resident abroad.

22.(b) See 11 FAM 430 previously furnished.

23. Does the Department maintain files on individual U.S. citizens who could be classified as potential "trouble makers" for foreign policy or security reasons? If so, please describe the extent of these files. Describe the inter-agency procedures in effect for sharing information of this nature.

23. Under Department regulations (22 C.F.R. 51.70(b)(4)) a passport may be refused to a person when the Secretary determines that his activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the



foreign policy of the United States. Information received by the Department bearing on the application of this regulation to a particular individual would be placed in the passport file of that individual. Also under Department regulations (22 C.F.R. 51.33), information in passport files is privileged and may not be released except:

"(b) Pursuant to a subpoena or court order directing the production of passport records.

"(c) At the request of another Government agency.

"(d) When expressly authorized by the Secretary."

Finally, as indicated in the enclosure (Tab D) labeled "Protective Intelligence", the Office of Security maintains some files on what might be called "trouble-makers."

24. Has the United States entered into international agreements for commitments concerning electronic surveillance operations involving foreign diplomatic missions in the U.S.? If so, please provide the text of those agreements or commitments?

24. There are no agreements of this kind. The Department is not aware of any commitments of this kind.

Telephone Addition to List of Questions:

When the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was submitted to the Senate, was any consideration given to the relationship of Article 22 to wiretaps or other electronic surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions?

ANSWER: We have no record that this matter was considered. However, our records do indicate that Article 22 was one which was considered by the United States as reflective of existing customary international law and United States practice and was not a change in law. We note the provisions of Article 47, paragraph 2, as of potential relevance.

Cordially,

Linwood Holton
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

As stated.

(TAB A)

433.10 Special Investigative Techniques

The Special investigative techniques such as trash cover, mail cover, technical or physical surveillance, or the polygraph, will not be used without prior approval of Headquarters. If the Special Agent in Charge deems a special Technique to be necessary the will submit his request in writing to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security through the Chief, Division of Investigations. Under no circumstances will any of the special techniques mentioned above be initiated without prior approval of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security.

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SUMMARY OF LEAK OF INFORMATION INVESTIGATIONS
CONDUCTED BY THE OFFICE OF SECURITY

1964

On March 26, 1964, the Associated Press and columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott of the Northern Virginia Sun carried articles concerning a sensitive project intended to determine the location of American defectors. No special investigative techniques were used and the source of the unauthorized disclosure was not identified. The Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs requested the inquiry.

In 1964 the Central Intelligence Agency requested investigation of the suspected unauthorized disclosure of a classified CIA document which had been distributed to the Department of State and other agencies. Investigation revealed that the document was handled in an irregular manner but that there was no actual compromise. No special investigative techniques were used.

1965

None conducted.

1966

On March 23, 1966, the New York Times published an article written by John D. Pomfret which revealed information from an administratively controlled airgram to the American Embassies in Paris and Moscow and also details of a classified internal memorandum which rebuked the Departmental official who was mistakenly thought to have authored the airgram. The source of the disclosure of the airgram was identified but the individual responsible for the disclosure of the classified memo was not. No special investigative techniques were used. The investigation was requested by the then Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

1967

None conducted.

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In 1968 the American Ambassador in Kinshasa learned about leak of certain sensitive in-house administrative matters to the local diplomatic community, requested an investigation by the Office of Security. No special investigative techniques were used and the source of the disclosures was never identified.

In 1968 the text of a Department of State classified telegram to the Embassy at Panama became known to a private American businessman. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for the area requested an investigation but the source of the disclosure was never identified. No special investigative techniques were used.

In 1968 the Inspector General, Department of Agriculture, requested investigation of the alleged unauthorized possession by an American businessman of a classified telegram which originated with the Agricultural Attache at the American Embassy, Saigon. The Office of Security began an inquiry but, when the matter appeared to come within the jurisdiction of the Inspections Staff of the Agency for International Development, the case was turned over to the latter agency.

In articles appearing in the October 18, 1968, and November 17, 1968, issues of the Washington Post, reporter Warren Unna revealed classified information concerning the sale of military equipment to Pakistan. The source of the unauthorized disclosure was never identified. No special investigative techniques were employed. The Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs requested the investigation.

1969

In 1969 the Department learned of the possibility that a classified report from the American Embassy, Montevideo, may have been disclosed to an American missionary in Uruguay while the latter was on leave in the United States. Investigation failed to identify the source of the disclosure. No special investigative techniques were used. The inquiry was conducted at the initiative of the Office of Security.

On February 25, 1969, an article in the Washington Post by Flora Lewis revealed classified information concerning U.S.-Spanish negotiations relating to U.S. bases in Spain. No special investigative techniques were used and the source of the unauthorized disclosure was not identified. The Country Director reported in advance

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that the article was due for publication and the results of the inquiry were reported to the Under Secretary.

On June 18, 1969, an article in the New York Times by Peter Grose revealed classified information derived from a meeting of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The Attorney General requested limited inquiries and affidavits prepared by those Departmental officials who had had access to the information were submitted to the Department of Justice. No special investigative techniques were used in the Departmental phase of the inquiry and State was not informed of the eventual resolution of the matter.

1970

On January 25, 1970, an administratively controlled telegram from the American Embassy, Ottawa, which concerned a deserter from the U.S. Navy, was shown and read on Canadian television. No special investigative techniques were used. The source of the disclosure was traced to U.S. Navy authorities in Boston who had received the message from an unidentified source in the Defense Attache Office, American Embassy, Ottawa. The investigation was requested by the American Embassy, Ottawa.

In 1970 the FBI requested investigation of an apparent unauthorized disclosure of one of its documents which had been disseminated to the Department of State and other agencies. The Department phase of this inquiry did not identify the source of the disclosure. No special investigative techniques were used and the Department does not know whether the source of the disclosure was ever identified.

1971

In a Washington Post article on February 7, 1971, Michael Getler revealed highly sensitive information derived from CIA information which had been distributed to several Federal agencies, including the Department of State. No special investigative techniques were used in the State phase of the inquiry and we do not know whether the source of the unauthorized disclosure was ever identified. The investigation was requested by CIA.

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American businessman was in possession of a Secret telegram originated by the American Embassy, Singapore. Investigation by State and the Department of Defense identified the source of the unauthorized disclosure as an official of the Department of Defense. No special investigative techniques were used in the Departmental phase of the inquiry. Results of the investigation were reported to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State and to the Secretary of Defense.

In an article in the Washington Evening Star on March 23, 1971, Jeremiah O'Leary disclosed highly classified information believed to have been derived from telegrams originated at the U.S. Embassy, Quito, and distributed to several Federal agencies. Investigation by State and Defense failed to identify the source of the leak. No special investigative techniques were used. Investigation was requested by the U.S. Embassy, Quito.

An article by George C. Wilson in the Washington Post on March 21, 1971, revealed information derived from a sensitive document which had been disseminated to a number of Federal agencies. Investigation of the State Department phase of the inquiry failed to disclose the source of the disclosure. No special investigative techniques were used. The U.S. Intelligence Board requested the investigation.

In his July 27, 1971, article in the Washington Post, Jack Anderson revealed information derived from an exchange of classified telegrams between the American Embassy at Nairobi and the Department of State. Investigation did not disclose the source of the unauthorized disclosure. Contrary to a subsequent Anderson column on September 30, 1971, no special investigative techniques were used. The inquiry was requested by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

On July 23, 1971, a New York Times article by William Beecher revealed highly classified information concerning the U.S. negotiating position in the SALT Talks. At the direction of the White House and with the qualified concurrence of the Secretary of State, three

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officials of the Department underwent polygraph examination administered by another Federal agency. The Secretary's approval was conditioned upon the willingness of the three officials and all three voluntarily participated. No other special investigative techniques were used by or in relation to Departmental personnel and, to the best of the Department's knowledge, the source of the disclosure was never identified. The Departmental phase of the investigation was requested by the Executive Secretary of the Department and all results were reported to Mr. Egil Krogh at the White House.

On August 13, 1971, an article in the New York Times by Tad Szulc revealed information derived from a classified CIA document which had been distributed to the Department of State. No special investigative techniques were used and the source of the disclosure was not identified. The Departmental phase of the investigation was requested by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management and the results were reported to Mr. Egil Krogh at the White House.

In 1971 several foreign newspapers published the substance of a Secret telegram which had been sent to our embassy at Paris and to our "interests section" at Algiers. Investigation revealed that the unauthorized disclosure probably occurred in the United States and possibly through one of the several other agencies which were included on the distribution of the telegram but the actual source was not identified. No special investigative techniques were used during the Departmental phase of the inquiry. The Office of Security initiated the investigation upon learning that the Algerian Government apparently had a copy of the telegram and the results of the inquiry were reported to the Country Directors most directly concerned.

1972

On July 26, 1972, a syndicated article by Jack Anderson concerning U.S.-Paraguayan efforts to control narcotics traffic revealed information derived from or attributed to classified State Department telegrams. The Country Director brought the matter to the attention of the

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Office of Security but did not specifically request an investigation. Limited inquiry revealed the most likely medium of the disclosure was a classified report prepared by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs which included the Department's information. Under the circumstances, the investigation was not continued by the Department of State. No special investigative techniques were used in the inquiry and the source of the disclosure was not identified.

On October 2, 1972, a syndicated column by Jack Anderson revealed information derived from or attributed to a classified telegram from the American Embassy at Kuwait. The Office of Security was not requested to conduct any investigation of the leak but did report the internal Departmental distribution of the telegram to the National Security Council at the latter's request. No special investigative techniques were used and there is no indication in the file that the source of the disclosure was ever identified.

On July 24, 1972, an article in the New York Times by Seymour Hersh revealed classified information from a report of the International Narcotics Control Task Force on Air and Sea Smuggling. An investigation by the Office of Security was unable to resolve conclusively the source of the disclosure. No special investigative techniques were used. The investigation was requested by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

1973

No investigations of unauthorized disclosure were conducted.

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TAB C

446 Miscellaneous Investigations

446.1 Leak of Information Cases

446.11 General

A leak of information case arises when classified or administratively controlled information becomes available to a person or persons not authorized to receive it. Obviously a person unauthorized to receive classified information is unlikely to reveal the source from which he obtained it. Therefore, the Special Agent, in all probability, will have to use an indirect method of investigation. Cases of this kind are extremely difficult to solve, since information may be disseminated in a variety of ways. However, certain inquiries may aid in determining how the material was compromised or at least indicate some of the ways in which compromise could have occurred.

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The Department receives information from offices abroad, other governments, other United States agencies, and private individuals. In addition to information that originates in the Department. The first step in a leak of information that has been compromised. After determining the origin and the date of its arrival in the Department of State, the Special Agent should look into the possibilities of compromise outside the Department. In this regard it may be necessary to request that inquiry be made abroad or by some other agency through Headquarters.

446.13 Investigation of Possibility of Leak in the Department

In following up possibilities of compromise within the Department, the number of copies of the basic document involved, together with the distribution given the copies, should be determined. If the basic document is (1) an Operations Memorandum; (2) a telegram; (3) a WIROM; or (4) an airgram, this information should be obtained from the Records Services Division. If the document in question is an Official-Informal letter or an office memorandum, the office of primary interest (action) will have to be contacted. Following this, inquiry must be made at each office receiving copies to determine the names of the individuals who received the document; the present location of the copies; whether any copies have been destroyed; and whether or not any person having access to the compromised information made the document available to others, discussed it with others, or discussed it in any place where the information might be inadvertently overheard by others. Inquiry must also be made to establish if any copy has been left exposed in an unoccupied office, has been taken from the Department, or otherwise handled in a way that might lend itself to compromise. In making these investigations, the Special Agent should coordinate with the appropriate unit security officers. The cooperation of the Special Assistant for Press Relations has been valuable in such cases, and he may be contacted. Representatives of the Press are not to be interviewed by Special Agents in connection with these cases without special permission from Headquarters.

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PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

In fulfilling its responsibilities for the protection of the Secretary of State and certain other dignitaries, the Office of Security maintains files concerning persons who have written threatening letters or otherwise made themselves suspect as potential threats to the safety of the Secretary or other persons protected. The relevant portion of our Instructions and Procedures is quoted below:

"The Office of Security maintains a 'crank and threat' file. The file is maintained in two parts: 1, alphabetical, by name; 2, geographical.

The file consists of all 'crank and threat' letters received by mail, summaries of all crank telephone calls, summaries of statements made by and the physical descriptions of all unauthorized visitors to the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, and information furnished by other intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government.

When the Secretary of State travels abroad or visiting dignitaries travel in the United States, pertinent information from this file is forwarded to the Special Agents and Security Officers concerned."

When the Secretary or other persons being protected travels to a different jurisdiction either home or abroad and we have reason to believe any potential sources of threat are located in these jurisdictions, it is our practice to provide a summary of information available regarding these sources of threat to the local official sharing the protective responsibilities. We also share protective intelligence information with the United States Secret Service and other Federal agencies as appropriate when the nature of the information suggest that it falls within the scope of the latter's lawful responsibilities.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 19 June 1974
TO: <input type="text"/>		
ROOM NO. 4E60	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>Per conversation with <input type="text"/></p> <p>Section concerned is clipped at top of pages. Please return to OLC when done.</p> <p><i>your copy.</i></p>		
FROM: OLC		
ROOM NO. 7D43	BUILDING Hqs	EXTENSION <input type="text"/>

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 (47) REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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